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Existential Reasons for Belief in God: A Defense of Desires
and Emotions for Faith
by Clifford Williams.
Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011. 188 pages.
Reviewed by Mark S. McLeod-Harrison

How should a Christian understand her faith? Through a detached, and so-called “rational,”
perspective? Or is faith “merely” emotional? Or some third way?
Faith, says Clifford Williams, is an emotion , but emotions are often misunderstood as detached
from reason. Williams’s mission in this clear and well-argued book is to explain how faith is
motivated and existentially justified by need, emotion and reason. “Need without reason is blind,
but reason without need is sterile” (p. 12). Like a good deal of good philosophy, reality lies
between the extremes, in this case, between the extremes of emotionalism and rationalism.
Two things stand out from among the many interesting and valuable points made in this book.
First is Williams’s use of personal accounts of faith and struggles with faith. Most chapters
contain stories by real, embodied people. Too much philosophy appeals to the abstract, the
distanced, the detached. Williams brings his theory into the concrete by discussing a number of
existential accounts of faith and its struggles.
Second is Williams’s important distinction between those needs (what some might want to call
“desires”) that are self-directed and those that are other-directed.
“This distinction challenges the common idea that those who believe in God because of need do
so only for the satisfaction of self-directed needs, that is, that they believe in God only for what
they can get from believing.” (p. 21)
Many, if not most, discussions of the argument for faith in God based in the emotions or needs of
the human person are swamped by the Freudian account of religious faith as an extension of our
selfish needs, thus vitiating the value of the argument. Williams’s distinction frames the question
in quite different and helpful terms.
Williams summarizes the book’s argument very well:
“1. We need cosmic security. We need to know that we will live beyond the grave in a state that
is free from the defects of this life, a state that is full of goodness and justice. We need a more
expansive life, one in which we love and are loved. We need meaning, and we need to know that
we are forgiven for going astray. We also need to experience awe, to delight in goodness and to
be present with those we love.

2. Faith in God satisfies those needs.
3. Therefore, we are justified in having faith in God.” (p. 32)
The conclusion here is not that God exists but that we are justified in having faith in God. This
distinction is an important one in that Williams takes care to distinguish existential arguments
from evidential arguments. The former do not necessarily argue for the truth of a claim whereas
the latter do. Rather, the former help to move us to live a certain way, in this case, in the way of
faith.
Another important feature of Williams’s book is that an existential argument, although facing a
number of challenges, can be bolstered by understanding how emotions are not simply detached
from reason. Indeed, emotions are, in many cases, cognitive. Emotions, argues Williams, are
“construals;” that is, an emotion is a way of seeing things. If I feel pity for my friend who has
lost his wallet it is in part because I construe the situation as one in which he has lost his
identification and other valuables. If, however, I discover that his wallet only contained his
library card, my pity quickly dissolves. Emotions have a clear cognitive component and that puts
them into, at least partly, the realm of evidence. Some emotions are good and well-founded,
others are not.
A final point about Williams’s book is this. One of the major struggles for feminist thought and
action is the attempt over the last 40 years to understand what it means to be a woman and what
it means to be a human. So much of the history of philosophy and theology is filled with a
“male” construal of human essence, largely consisting of the disembodied and detached notion of
the “rational” person. This book goes some distance toward a more whole account of the human,
an account that in many ways is feminist. I applaud Williams for his efforts, and although not
stated as the burden of the book, the fact that it presents a more whole picture of the human
person and the Christian faith makes it a book of value for feminists, Christian and otherwise.
I highly recommend Existential Reasons for Belief in God as a clear, well-presented and
insightful work that could provide a framework for further helpful work in living the Christian
life and being a Christian and a feminist.

